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Notes and Comments
DAMAGES UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The federal circuit courts of appeals are in conflict concerning
the proof required at the "buyer level"' to support a verdict for dam-
ages for a Robinson-Patman Act violation.' Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, which allows recovery for violation of the antitrust laws, states
that :
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefore in any district court of the United States in the district
in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, with-
out respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.'
As in the case of many other seemingly simple statutes, interpretation
of this section has produced much litigation. Despite the "any person"
language of the Act, the courts have allowed recovery only to plaintiffs
who have been "directly" injured, denying recovery to plaintiffs who
have been only indirectly injured.4 On the question of injury itself,
the elements of proof which must be present in order to show the
amount of damages to which a plaintiff is entitled - as opposed to
the fact of injury5 - may vary depending upon whether a Sherman
Act rather than a Robinson-Patman Act violation is alleged. If a
price increase which violates the Sherman Act is proven, the amount
of that increase can be the measure of damages for that violation.6
The Robinson-Patman Act merely forbids a seller to "discriminate
in price," an act which could consist of either the making of an illegal
overcharge or the granting of an illegal discount (or a combination
of both). To the extent that a Robinson-Patman Act discrimination
consists of an overcharge, the measure of damages which will be
awarded a plaintiff injured by that overcharge will be the same as
that used in measuring damages for price increases which violate
the Sherman Act. But some courts hold that mere proof of the fact
1. See text at note 42 infra for a definition of "buyer level."
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
4. Wright, Legal Cause in Treble Damage Actions Under the Clayton Act, 27
MD. L. Rav. 275 (1967).
5. Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in TrebleDamage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 231, 236 (1962)(Sherman Act cases) [hereinafter cited as Timberlake] ; Comment, Federal Antitrust
Law - Price Discrimination - Proof and Measurement of Damages in Treble
Damage Actions, 60 MicH. L. REV. 1104, 1110 (1962) (Robinson-Patman Act cases)[hereinafter cited Comment, 60 MicH. L. REv.].
6. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 389 (9th Cir. 1957).
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of an illegal discount - the most common type of Robinson-Patman
Act discrimination - is not sufficient to allow recovery of the amount
of that discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act and require
the plaintiff to make a direct proof of his loss of profits. As will be
examined more fully later in this comment, one rationale offered for
making this distinction is that it is more difficult to measure the injury
to one illegally denied a discount by the amount of that discount given
to another than it is to measure the injury to one required to pay an
illegal overcharge by the amount of that overcharge.' And yet section
4 of the Clayton Act makes no distinction between a price increase
and a price decrease; nor does it distinguish between a Sherman Act
and a Robinson-Patman Act violation. Its operation simply is premised
upon a violation of the "antitrust laws" that causes injury to "business
or property." It is in the interpretation of what constitutes an injury
to "business or property" and of how that injury is to be measured
that the conflict has arisen.
The rule of recovery under the Sherman Act was recently re-
affirmed in a Supreme Court decision, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.' United had violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act by its monopolistic policy of only leasing rather than selling its
more complicated machinery. Plaintiff had been forced to rent such
machinery for more than it would have cost9 to buy the same machines
from United. The district court awarded Hanover the difference,
trebled. On appeal to the Supreme Court, United contended that the
plaintiff had not shown that it had suffered any cognizable injury and
that, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to no recovery. United based
its contention upon the fact that Hanover had not shown that it had
not passed on to its purchasers the expense incurred by the payment
of the difference between the purchase price and the rental fee. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument:
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person "who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained. . . ." We think
it sound to hold that when a buyer shows that the price paid by
him for materials purchased for use in his business is illegally
high and also shows the amount of the overcharge, he has made
out a prima facie case of injury and damage within the meaning
of § 4.
If in the face of the overcharge the buyer does nothing and
absorbs the loss, he is entitled to treble damages. This much
7. Comment, 60 MicH. L. REV. at 1117, 1125.
8. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
9. The district court estimated what the purchase price of these machines would
have been by adjusting the last purchase price which Hanover had paid for its
machinery by a multiplier (derived from several factors, including the Labor Statistics
Consumer Price Index, life expectancy rates, salvage values, and estimated servicing
costs) so as to approximate what Hanover would have paid in the contemporary
market. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258 (M.D.
Pa. 1965).
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seems conceded. The reason is that he has paid more than he
should and his property has been illegally diminished, for had
the price paid been lower his profits would have been higher. It is
also clear that if the buyer, responding to the illegal price, main-
tains his own price but takes steps to increase his volume or
to decrease other costs, his right to damages is not destroyed.
Though he may manage to maintain his profit level, he would
have made more if his purchases from the defendant had cost
him less. We hold that the buyer is equally entitled to damages
if he raises the price for his own product. As long as the seller
continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer
more than the law allows. At whatever price the buyer sells, the
price he pays the seller remains illegally high, and his profits
would be greater were his costs lower.1"
The Court went on to explain the great difficulty of proving either
that the purchaser had, in fact, passed on to its own purchasers the
cost of paying the higher price or the effect of that extra cost
upon profits, stating that definite conclusions would be "virtually
unascertainable."' "
Although the case concerns the legality of a price increase under
the Sherman Act, the language, at least, is relevant to a discussion
of Robinson-Patman Act damages. When the Court stated that "[a]s
long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from
the buyer more than the law allows . . . and his profits would be
greater were his costs lower," it recognized that at the point of pay-
ment of the illegal price the buyer loses profits ;12 to then look into
10. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1968)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
11. The Court stated:
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. Normally the
impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured after
the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact been
different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more
buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a
different price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world rather
than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company's
price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of
total sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised
his price in response to, and in the amount of, the overcharge and that his margin
of profit and total sales had not thereafter declined, there would remain the
nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could
not or would not have raised his prices absent the overcharge or maintained the
higher price had the overcharge been discontinued. Since establishing the appli-
capability of the passing-on defense would require a convincing showing of each
of these virtually unascertainable figures, the task would normally prove insur-
mountable. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that if the existence of the
defense is generally confirmed, antitrust defendants will frequently seek to estab-
lish its applicability. Treble-damage actions would often require additional long
and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories.
Id. at 492-93 (emphasis added).
12. However, the Court recognized that there are situations in which paying the
illegal price might not automatically lead to injury, such as where the plaintiff is
operating under a "cost plus" contract, or in which "no differential can be proved
between the price unlawfully charged and some price that the seller was required by
law to charge .. " Id. at 494. For examples of the latter situation, the Court cited
two Robinson-Patman Act cases. An examination of those cases would indicate that
the Court was referring to a factual situation in which the seller charged a discrimi-
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either the economic effects of the illegal price or the pricing policies
of the company would invite "long and complicated proceedings in-
volving massive evidence and complicated theories," a result which
the Court was desirous of avoiding.13
The approach of looking no farther than the imposition of the
illegal price upon the plaintiff's purchases, in recognition that pay-
ment of that price necessarily leads to a loss of profits, is a concept
which has been utilized by the Supreme Court not only in Sherman
Act cases but also as early as 1947 in a Robinson-Patman Act case.
In Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co. 4 the Court, without then
deciding whether a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act had occurred,
natory price but the price which the seller should have charged was not susceptible
to easy determination [see, e.g., American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191
F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951), discussed at note 69 infra] or where the legal price was known
but a determination of the actual illegal price required the unraveling of such a com-
plex factual situation that it became impossible to segregate the overlapping discrimi-
nations into categories in order to ascertain that amount of discrimination which should
be awarded as "general" damages [see American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187
F.2d 919, opinion modified, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951), petition for cert. dismissed,
342 U.S. 875 (1951), discussed at note 14 infra]. See also Comment, Antitrust
Enforcement By Private Parties: Analysis of Development in Treble Damage Suits,
61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1024 n.91 (1952) [hereinfater cited as Comment, 61 YALE L.J.].
13. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 US. 481, 493 (1968).
See Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533 (1918) :
"The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond
the first step."
14. 330 U.S. 743 (1947). Since the issue of American Can's liability to Bruce's
Juices was not properly before the Court, the case was retried. Bruce's Juices, Inc.
v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949). On relitigation the dis-
trict court concluded that "proof of special damage is not essential to recovery"
and cited, inter alia, the Supreme Court's opinion in Bruce's Juices and that of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co.,
150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945), as support for the validity
of the "general damages" approach. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F.
Supp. 985, 990 (S.D. Fla. 1949). However, the court did not set the general damages
at an amount equal to the total amount of the discrimination because "there is an over-
lapping therein which must be taken in consideration and omitted from [the] judg-
ment." Id. at 993. Part of the "overlapping" arose from the plaintiff's claiming as a
measure of damages not only the amount of the discrimination but also such things as
loss of good will. The court determined that the plaintiff's good will had been ad-
versely affected by the defendant's discrimination, but awarded the amount of this loss
as consequential, rather than general, damages. Id. at 990-93. On appeal [American
Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), opinion modified, 190 F.2d
73 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951)], the court of appeals agreed
that the plaintiff's "good will and reputation were injured," thereby entitling it to
damages, and in reviewing the district court's award of damages concluded that
"the judgment rendered is fully in accord with the principles enunciated in the
applicable authorities." Id. at 924, citing Bruce's Juices; Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.
v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945);
and Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) (a Sherman
Act decision in which it was stated that the "wrongdoer shall bear the risk of uncer-
tainty which his own wrong has created"). Since the plaintiff was able to obtain
general damages for the discrimination and was also able to recover consequential
damages for loss of "good will and reputation," his total recovery was more than
the amount of the discrimination alone, even after "overlapping" had been taken into
consideration by the court. American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919,
923-24 (5th Cir. 1951). See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. at 1024 n.91. The Hanover Court
cited this case for the proposition that "where no differential can be proved between
the price unlawfully charged and some price that the seller was required by law to
charge, establishing damages might require a showing of loss of profits to the buyer,"
the words "no differential" apparently meaning "no difference measured in an exact
amount of dollars." Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
494 (1968). See note 81 infra.
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decided that the Robinson-Patman Act does not authorize the use
of its treble-damage remedy as a collateral defense against a contract
suit for a purchase price but that the remedy must instead be the
subject of an independent suit since the violation was not inherent in
the contract sued upon. Discussing the elements of proof which would
be necessary to obtain that remedy were the plaintiff to prove that
a violation had occurred, the Court stated in dicta that:
. . . despite petitioner's plaint on the difficulty of proving dam-
ages, it would establish its right to recover three times the dis-
criminatory difference without proving more than the illegality
of the prices. If the prices are illegally discriminatory, petitioner
has been damaged, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
at least in the amount of that discrimination. 5
The significance of this passage lies in the fact that the Court recog-
nized, as it later did in Hanover, that absent "extraordinary circum-
stances" the measure of damages would be the "amount of [the]
discrimination," and that to recover this amount the plaintiff need
prove only the "illegality of the prices." As it did in Hanover, the
Court realized the difficulty of proving damages and accordingly
provided for a simplified method of proof.
Identity of treatment in Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act
cases is certainly reasonable if discrimination which is illegal under
the Robinson-Patman Act is considered to have the same competitive
effect as an increase in cost of operation resulting from a price in-
crease which violates the Sherman Act. This approach is justified by
the fact that in both cases the non-favored buyer will be paying more
for similar goods than will the favored buyer, so that the non-favored
buyer necessarily will have less profit with which to compete than
will the favored competitor, which in turn will lessen his competi-
tive position. 6
Justification for the distinction between overcharges and discounts
in setting the method of measuring damages traditionally has been
predicated upon the fact that an overcharge is a direct injury because
the non-favored buyer is charged more than he would have paid absent
15. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947).
16. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945): "The Act thus
places emphasis on individual competitive situations, rather than upon a general
system of competition." In American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d
38, 61 (8th Cir. 1951), Judge Johnsen in a dissenting opinion agreed with the
majority on the issue of the allowance of general damages (see text at note 82 infra)
and in so doing stated:
It is possible for illegal discriminations between immediate competitors to have
consequential effects also, of such a nature as can properly, I think, give rise to
a recovery right beyond the amount or value of the discrimination. Thus, price
discriminations, in addition to the direct pecuniary injury to a dealer in his busi-
ness treasury front being required to pay more for his purchases than his
immediate competitor, also conceivably, if sufficiently continued, could operate
to destroy or impair his business in the seller's products or the business conducted
by him resting upon a collateral use of such products.
(Emphasis added.) See Comment, 60 MIcH. L. REv. at 1131-32; Comment, 61 YALE
L.J. at 1023. See also Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969);
National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 522 (7th Cir. 1968) ; State
Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 202 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
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the illegal activity, while a discount can be considered not to be
immediately injurious since the non-favored customer is charged the
price which he normally pays, the favored customer merely receiving
a potential advantage. 7 Under this rationale it is not until the favored
customer exercises his advantage to the detriment of the non-favored
buyer that the latter will be injured.18
The Supreme Court not only rejected, in its dictum in Bruce's
Juices, the validity of this distinction but also suggested a contrary
approach in FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,'9 another Robinson-Patman
Act case. There the government complained that Morton Salt dis-
criminated between its buyers when it gave unjustified quantity dis-
counts. The Court stated that in proving "discrimination in price"
(the language used in the Robinson-Patman Act) "in a case involving
competitive injury between a seller's customers the Commission need
only prove that a seller had charged one purchaser a higher price
for like goods than he had charged one or more of the purchaser's
competitors."2 By this the Court has translated a price discrimina-
tion in favor of one competitor into a "price increase" for the other
competitor for the purposes of determining competitive injury. In
other words, because "the competitive opportunities of certain mer-
chants were injured when they had to pay [Morton] substantially
more for their goods than their competitors had to pay," the Court
viewed the "discriminatory discounts" - Morton's quantity discounts
at the buyer level - as having had the same effect upon competition
as an increase of the price charged to the non-favored competitor.21
Although the Court was directing its discussion merely to the deter-
mination of whether injury had occurred, its analysis of the com-
petitive injury question dictates a similar answer to the question of
how damages are to be measured since, if the non-favored buyer's
"competitive opportunities" were "injured" by the discrimination, it is
reasonable to conclude that he was damaged at least to the same extent.
17. Comment, 60 MICH. L. REV. at 1124-25.
18. See ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385 (1933) ; Enterprise
Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459-60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965(1957) (excessive charges are recoverable as direct damages while injuries from dis-
counts must be proven), cited in Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F.
Supp. 59, 66-69, appeal denied, 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964) ("passing-on" is no de-
fense to a suit based upon an illegal overcharge). But see National Dairy Prods. Corp.
v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 522 (7th Cir. 1968) (a discount to one competitor, whether or
not used by him in setting prices, renders excessive the price charged the non-favored
competitor and decreases the latter's profit margin) ; Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC,
348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1965) (the favored competitor does not have to use the
benefit which he receives from an illegal discrimination to obtain an advantage over
the non-favored buyer, because the competitive injury is created by the violation;
the court equates the giving of a discount with charging the non-favored competitor
an excessive price). Cf. Comment, 60 MIcH. L. REv. at 1117, 1125.
19. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
20. Id. at 45.
21. Id. at 46-47. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960) ; Borden
Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 177 (1967). Borden demonstrates the difference between
viewing the discrimination as a "price difference" for purposes of primary-line de-
cisions and as a cost increase for purposes of secondary-line decisions. See also FTC
v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945) ("a price discrimination is
measured by the difference between the high price to one purchaser and the lower
price to another").
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Actually the rule which should be applied in Robinson-Patman
Act cases follows a fortiori from Hanover. In Hanover, United had
a monopoly position in the shoe machinery market and most buyers
were similarly overcharged. Thus, it was likely that Hanover, as
one of those buyers, could have passed on the overcharge and avoided
injury because most, and perhaps all, of its competitors had to deal
with the overcharge also. And yet the Supreme Court refused to
provide for a consideration of the likelihood that such "passing on"
occurred in determining the measure of damages. If those damages
are measured merely by the amount of the illegal overcharge even
where "passing on" is likely to have occurred, then it certainly follows
that such proof should be sufficient to allow recovery in situations,
such as those involving violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, in
which such complete "passing on" of the extra costs by the unfavored
buyer is usually less likely to have been possible. It is in the latter
cases that it is generally more difficult to prove what the favored
competitor's price would have been had he not received the illegal
discount, since those factors which determine how a competitor sets
prices are very complex ;22 in the Hanover situation this proof would
have been difficult enough to accomplish, even though in that case
the "overcharge" policy was applied uniformly to all of United's cus-
tomers. Since the reasoning of Hanover itself suggests that proof
of when and how a favored buyer used his advantage to a non-favored
buyer's detriment would be difficult, the damages awarded in a Robin-
son-Patman Act case should be measured by at least the amount of the
illegal difference in price. But strangely enough, despite the language
and logic of the Supreme Court decisions, 23 the federal circuit courts
of appeals are still not in agreement on the elements of proof which
are required for recovery in Robinson-Patman Act cases.
This reluctance of some courts to apply the liberal damage rule
of Hanover in Robinson-Patman Act cases, or to follow the Supreme
Court's dictum in Bruce's Juices, does not seem to be part of a general
judicial disfavor for that Act, for as to other elements of a private
action under the Act the courts have been more uniformly willing to
dispense with strict requirements of proof.
I. PROOF OF INJURY To COMPETITION AND To PLAINTIFF
For a private plaintiff suing under the Robinson-Patman Act to
establish a prima facie case, he must satisfy certain jurisdictional
requirements ;24 and he must prove (1) that the defendant has made a
22. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488-95 (1968).
23. Further, in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946),
the Court stated: "Any other rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrong-
doing at the expense of his victim . . . [by making] wrongdoing so effective and
complete in every case as to preclude any recovery, by rendering the measure of
damages uncertain. . . . [T]he more grievous the wrong done, the less likelihood
there would be of a recovery. . . . [T]he wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the un-
certainty which his own wrong has created."
24. In addition, the Act cannot apply unless there are sales of commodities of
like grade and quality in commerce. F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 36 (1962) [hereinafter cited as RowE].
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discrimination in price or allowance which is prohibited by the Act,25
(2) that the making of this discrimination has caused injury to the
plaintiff, and (3) the amount of the injury.26 The felicity with which
a plaintiff can establish that the defendant has made a prohibited
discrimination varies according to the type of discrimination involved.
Section 2 (a) 27 bars price discrimination the effect of which "may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit
of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them, ' 28 while
false brokerage payments are prohibited by section 2(c) 29 and dis-
criminatory allowances and services are prohibited by sections 2(d)
and 2(e) respectively."0 Although the conduct described by section
2(a) is prohibited by that section only if it has certain competitive
effects, the remaining sections do not require the conduct which they
describe to have such an effect in order for it to be prohibited; the
transactions proscribed by those sections are absolute violations re-
gardless of their competitive impact.3l  Since the making of false
brokerage payments and the giving of discriminatory allowances and
services are themselves relatively easy to prove (the only issue usually
being whether the transaction in question was made on "substantially
equal terms""2 with a normal transaction), a plaintiff injured by such
conduct generally has little difficulty in establishing the first element
of proof: that the defendant has made a prohibited discrimination.
But proof of a section 2 (a) violation is not as easy since the burden
of proving not only that a transaction occurred but that it was in-jurious to competition can be awesome.3 3  Many courts have allowed
plaintiffs to overcome this difficulty by permitting the jury to find the
fact of competitive injury with relative ease 4 while others have gone
further and allowed it to be assumed.33
As the law now stands, whether or not competitive injury may
simply be assumed depends upon whether primary- or secondary-line
competition is involved.36 The classic primary-line situation - also
25. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1963).
26. Id. See Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-On Defense:
The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183, 1184 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Pollock]; Timberlake, supra note 5, at 232, 236.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1963).
28. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1963) ; RowE, supra note
24, at 37 (for a discussion of the elements).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1963).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d), (e) (1963).
31. ROWE, supra note 24, at 36-39.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c), (d), (e) (1963).
33. See, e.g., Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1951), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952), where the plaintiff was required
to pay more for the most expensive component part of his oil burner than was his
competitor but yet was allowed no recovery despite this extra cost because he did not
prove that the resale price was affected.
34. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
35. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
36. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 552 n.21 (1960) ; RowE, supra
note 24, at 172-73, 180-81; Austern, Presumption and Percipience About Competitive
Effect Under Section 2 of Clayton Act, 81 HARV. L. REV. 773, 777 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Austern].
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referred to as "seller-line competition" - is present when there are
two sellers and a common buyer and one of the sellers attempts to
undercut the other's price to the common buyer, thereby forcing a
reduction of the other seller's profits." A secondary-line situation -
also referred to as buyer- or customer-level competition - involves
a common seller who discriminates between at least two competing
buyers, so that eventually the non-favored buyer will suffer a loss."8
It is in the latter situation that a right to obtain general damages -
damages measured by the amount of the discrimination - is most
important, for it is in this class of plaintiffs that one usually finds
the small businessman who does not have the necessary funds to sus-
tain the lengthy trial which is usually necessary to prove that there
has been an injury to competition.
Primary-line decisions have not been totally consistent in their
approach to analyzing competitive injury under section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. Initially it was thought that injury to com-
petition must be proven, 9 although some courts disagreed.4" More
recently, the Supreme Court in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co.4' held that a showing of the existence of a highly competitive situa-
tion, a price discrimination and a declining price structure in the local
market is sufficient evidence for the jury to find that competitive in-
jury occurred despite increased sales volume or the existence of profits.
The Court reasoned that this evidence could support a finding that
the plaintiff seller's profits had been significantly diminished and that
this diminution had in turn reduced its ability to compete, thus causing
injury to competition.42 This holding, although not providing for an
actual assumption of competitive injury in primary-level cases (be-
cause the Court would require proof of more than just the fact that
a price discrimination had occurred in a highly competitive situation),
does reduce the burden of proving such injury in those cases and thus
allows the Act to reach price discriminations that subtly erode com-
petition as well as those that have a more immediate and obvious
destructive effect.4" It is also in accordance with the statutory lan-
guage which bars discrimination the effect of which "may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition between competing sellers."44
Robinson-Patman Act case law governing proof of injury to
competition in secondary-line situations has been more consistent. It
37. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
38. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) ; Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick.
415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969).
39. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 787, 789-90
(7th Cir. 1951) ; ROWE, supra note 24, at 127; Austern, supra note 36, at 777.
40. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 734 (1945), cited with approval in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37,
45 n.13 (1948).
41. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
42. Id. at 699-700.
43. Id. at 703. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 177-80 (5th Cir. 1967).
44. Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738-39 (1945), cited in FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948) ; National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC,
395 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1968) ; 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1963).
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is uniformly held that it is appropriate for the trier of fact to make a
finding of illegality, based upon an actual assumption of competitive
injury, when the plaintiff, one of two or more competitive buyers,
is the victim of a substantial and sustained discrimination. 5 Proof
that the favored buyer did not undersell need not be conclusive of the
issue of injury to the plaintiff or to competition in general since thejury is entitled to infer injury from the mere fact that the favored
customer is left with more profits with which to compete.46 What
the courts have done in primary-" and secondary-line 4s cases is
to view both the competitive effect 49 of the discrimination and the
injury which it causes to the plaintiff from the standpoint of the dis-
45. E.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47-51 (1948). See Corn Prod.
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945); National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC,
395 F.2d 517 (1968); C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 234 (1959);
Comment, 60 MIcH. L. Rv. at 1108.
46. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 959 (1965). For a decision in which injury to competition was not assumed,
see Alexander v. Texas Co., 165 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1958), which seems to have
been overruled by Foremost.
47. In Utah Pie competition itself was enhanced but at the expense of one of the
competitors; the enhancement was instigated by the regional price discrimination
of the respondents. The Supreme Court accepted this enhancement as both injury
to competition and injury to the plaintiff. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co., 386 U.S. 685, 705 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (the "Court has fallen
into the error of reading the Robinson-Patman Act as protecting competitors, in-
stead of competition"). Since the Act makes actionable both injuries to competition
and injuries to the plaintiff's business that affect competition [§ 2(a)], RowE, supra
note 24, at 37, the Court's application of the Act tends to be result-oriented in favor
of the plaintiffs. Austern, supra note 36, at 776-77. Therefore, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of a showing of injury to the plaintiff competitor in such a way as to
also find the requisite injurious effect upon competition appears reasonable. Auto-
matic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
48. See Comment, 60 MicH. L. REv. at 1108-10. The whole assumption of injury
to competition in the secondary-line case is premised on the theory that a price dis-
crimination in secondary-line cases necessarily causes injury to the plaintiff and
that an injury to the plaintiff is necessarily an injury to competition. Further, section
2(a) specifically requires a showing of injury to the plaintiff or to competition while
the other sections do not. See Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 (1965).
49. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326U.S. 734 (1945), cited in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45 n.13 (1948) (theSupreme Court cited the Moss primary-line decision, that a showing of price dis-
crimination and jurisdictional elements alone will support violations, as support for its
holding in Morton Salt, a secondary-line case). Murray, Injury to Competition Under
the Robinson-Patman Act: Futility Rezisited, 29 U. PiTr. L. Rv. 623, 628 n.22(1968) [hereinafter cited as Murray].
Interestingly, Moss was one of the first primary-line cases to procedurally
assume, under section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, competitive injury upon a
showing of discrimination and to establish by this assumption the prima facie case.Upon this showing, it was up to the defendant to rebut the presumption thus created.
In Morton the Supreme Court cited the Moss approach as being acceptable in
secondary-line cases. But the Supreme Court itself (as well as most commentators)
did not apply this so-called "abberational" procedural assumption, leaving it up to theplaintiff to prove that the discrimination caused competitive injury before he could
establish a prima facie case. RowE, supra note 24, at 108. However, Judge Hand
reiterated the rule in Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 460 (2d
Cir. 1957). The Supreme Court seems now to have acquiesced and is now willing
to permit the threshold injury to be established without great effort when it allows
the jury to find competitive injury on a showing of the requisite discrimination and
the existence of both a highly competitive situation and a declining price structure,
which thereby lessens the difference between primary- and secondary-line cases with
respect to the requirements for establishing competitive injury. Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Murray, supra note 49, at 650.
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favored plaintiff in their findings of competitive injury.50 Thus the
evidence which is sufficient under the relaxed standard for proving
competitive injury on the primary level and which allows the assumption
of injury to competition on the secondary level also necessarily satisfies
the requirement of proof of injury to plaintiff.
None of the Supreme Court decisions in cases involving the
Robinson-Patman Act refldct a policy of restricting chances of re-
covery by imposing rigorous standards of proof, by the injured
buyer, of a prima facie case; i.e., of proof of the requisite jurisdictional
elements, of competitive injury and of injury to himself. Further,
as suggested earlier, the Supreme Court has extended its use of this
liberal approach to the question of the measure of damages, so as to
allow "general" damage awards under section 4 of the Clayton Act;
it is here, however, that the various federal circuit courts of appeals
have been recalcitrant.
II. THE AMOUNT OF THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION
As THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Although there were earlier decisions in the Sixth Circuit which
set the damages at an amount equal to the amount of the price dis-
crimination,5 ' the first opinion to discuss the damage question was
that of Judge Johnsen 2 in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass
Co." Violations of sections 2(d) and (e) were found where the
defendant had discriminated between two competitors in furnishing
the pay and services of sales clerks. As discussed earlier, sections
2(d) and (e) do not require that these discriminations cause com-
petitive injury in order to be prohibited; hence the plaintiff did not
need to establish that there was any competitive injury in order to
show a violation of the Act and thereby prove the first element of a
prima facie case. As for the second element, that of injury to the
plaintiff itself, the court held that making the illegal discrimination
alone constituted the necessary injury to the plaintiff, thus utilizing
the established assumption in secondary-line cases. As for the third
element, proof of the amount of the injury, the court held that the
50. See notes 47 & 48 supra. See also FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37,
49 (1948), discussed in RoWE, supra note 24, at 27; FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945) ("The Act thus places emphasis on individual competitive
situations, rather than upon a general system of competition.").
51. The first Robinson-Patman Act case to grant damages was Fitch v. Kentucky-
Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943). No consideration is
given herein to this decision with respect to its approach to awarding damages since,
as in Bruce's Juices, the court assumed without discussion that damages could be
awarded in an amount equal to three times the amount of the discrimination. See
Ben B. Schwartz & Sons, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 92, 100 (E.D.
Mich. 1962) (damages awarded in an amount equal to the amount of the discrimina-
tion). But cf. Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1961), a cryptic
decision the effects of which are unclear, where the appellate court accepted the
lower court's jury instruction requiring that damages "be determined with reasonable
certainty." Id. at 499.
52. The conflict in the appellate courts primarily centers around the relative
merits of opinions by Judge Johnsen, who follows the reasoning of Hanover and
Bruce's Juices, and by Judge Hand, who does not.
53. 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
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amount of the discrimination could be the measure by which a "general"
damage award would be granted. The Arden court reasoned that,
since the seller had not provided the services equally, the plaintiff
had sustained a direct loss in the increased cost of operation to the
extent of the differences in the allowances; since the statute required
that the seller provide the services on equal terms, to deny recovery
of the full amount of these damages would be to weaken the effectiveness
of the statute.5 4
The defendant contended that such a damage award was barred
by the Supreme Court's rule governing damages awarded under the
Interstate Commerce Act, wherein language providing for the recovery
of damages is similar to that of the Clayton Act.5 5 The Court
stated that the rationale and policy of the "Interstate Commerce
Act prevents any recognition of a legal right to recover general
damages under that Act. . . . To permit a recovery of general
damages for the amount of a discriminatory rebate or concession
[which are prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act] would be
equivalent to the granting of another rebate or concession,"56 and
thus would contravene the purpose of that Act. On the other hand,
sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act were not intended
to prohibit the furnishing of clerk's services or the paying of clerk's
salaries to any customer; rather, their purpose is to assure that these
services and salaries are furnished only on equal terms. The court
stated that, since the seller is commanded by those sections to provide
services and salaries equally, they saw no reason not to effectuate that
result through the granting of a general damage award.' The court
might well have added that, in suits for reparations for overcharges
under the Interstate Commerce Act,58 the Supreme Court has held
54. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945).
55. ICC v. United States ex tel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385 (1932); Keogh v.Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-TaenzerLumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918). ICC cases are a precarious precedent. Campbellpoints out that in these cases the rates received by the competing shippers were notin themselves unreasonable; if they had been unreasonable a general damage award
would have been warranted. In cases where the rates were reasonable (as determinedby the ICC) but discriminatory, the disfavored shipper was required to prove hisdamages; injury was not assumed from the mere fact that the rates were discrimina-
tory. Since the Robinson-Patman Act proscribes inequality of treatment between
competing buyers, prices cannot be discriminatory and yet still be reasonable; there are
cases in which, but for the Act, they might have been. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37(1948). If prices are discriminatory they are necessarily unreasonable and the dis-favored buyer is assumed to have suffered injury. But perhaps Campbell has validityin primary-line cases. In such situations the mere fact of the discrimination is unim-portant in establishing a right to damages unless the plaintiff can also prove injury.
The rate cases generally do not involve only the local market, buyer-level
competitors which the Robinson-Patman Act was designed to protect; rather, thedisfavored parties in the rate cases are in "competition . . . with many other producersdoing business in distant territory." ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289U.S. 385, 391 (1932). These considerations led the Arden court to restrict the prece-dential value of the transportation rate cases to their peculiar factual situations.
56. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 995 (8th
Cir. 1954).
57. Id. at 996.
58. 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
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that the amount of overcharge is recoverable despite the absence of
ultimate injury.59
Finally, in answer to the defendant's contention that Congress
had deleted a provision for general damage recovery from the final
draft of the Robinson-Patman Act,6" the Arden court reasoned that,
59. Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
In the past, rate cases have made a distinction between the recovery of price
differentials involving higher rates (overcharges) than those found reasonable by the
ICC and the recovery of price differentials involving rates which, but for a conspiracy
on the part of carriers, would have been lower throughout the market than those found
reasonable by ICC. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). In Keogh
the ICC had found the rates charged to Keogh to have been reasonable under the
then existing transportation laws. Nevertheless, Keogh sued for violations of the anti-
trust laws, alleging that the rates were set at an illegally high position as the result
of a conspiracy of the carriers. (The allegation was, apparently, that the carriers
had caused the ICC to be misinformed as to what the rates reasonably should be.)
The Court held that there could be no violation of antitrust laws where the rates
were found to be reasonable; moreover, the Court reasoned in dicta that even if the
rates should have been lower they, like the rates actually charged, would have been
used throughout the industry, and that the plaintiff would have remained on a parity
with its competitors: "Under these circumstances no court or jury could say that, if
the rate had been lower, Keogh would have enjoyed the difference between the rates
or that any other advantage would have accrued to him. The benefit might have gone
to his customers, or conceivably, to the ultimate consumer." Id. at 165. It would then
be the ultimate consumer who should maintain a suit.
The rate case distinction between illegally high and illegally low rate situa-
tions was discussed in a footnote in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481, 490 n.8 (1968), where the Court referred to Keogh. United had raised
as a defense the assertion that this form of passing-on had occurred. But the Hanover
Court noted that the Keogh Court would treat proof of an overcharge as entitling
the plaintiff to general damages and further stated, "We ascribe no general signifi-
cance to the Keogh dictum [which suggested the validity of this passing-on defense]
for cases where the plaintiff is free to prove that he has been charged an illegally
high price." Id. Moreover, Keogh deals with an unlawful combination in rate
cases; it is not a price discrimination case. The lower rate in Keogh would have
been charged throughout the industry; anyone paying it would not have been placed
in a worse competitive situation than that of any of its competitors. The Robinson-
Patman Act does not make illegal a price which is charged uniformly throughout
the industry; any illegality of such a uniform price will arise under the Sherman Act.
Because the Keogh dictum only concerns such uniform rates, it is inapplicable to a
discussion of Robinson-Patman Act damages.
Keogh has been used as authority for the notion that a "passing-on" defense
generally is good against a middleman-plaintiff, but not against a consumer-plaintiff,
even in situations in which the unfavorable price is not charged throughout the indus-
try, but is instead charged discriminatorily; the rationale is that a non-favored
middleman in fact passes on the extra cost. See Pollock, supra note 28, at 1192.
See also Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830, 833-34(3d Cir. 1962). Hanover does not make such a distinction although the decision is
not inconsistent with such a position since the plaintiff was not in the business of
reselling the machines which it purchased. But whatever validity this argument may
have with respect to Sherman Act price-fixing cases (Pollock, supra note 28, at
1202), there is serious doubt that it would apply to Robinson-Patman Act price
discrimination cases because of the inescapable language of Hanover (and Bruce's
Juices) emphasizing that, regardless of his ability to pass on the extra cost, the
non-favored buyer will always have less profits with which to compete.
60. The damage provision originally read in part:
For purposes of suit under Section 4 of [the Clayton] Act, the measure of
damages for any violation of this section shall, where the fact of damage is
shown, and in the absence of proof of greater damage, be presumed to be the
pecuniary amount or equivalent of the prohibited discrimination, payment, or
grant involved in such violation. ...
It appeared in the Report of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 1502,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 8 (1936), but did not appear in the House version, H.R. REP.
No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-20 (1936), nor was it utilized in conference. CONF.
REP. H. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
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in situations where the amount of the discrimination properly can be
said to constitute direct damage, the absence of a specific general damage
provision would not have any significance. However, in situations
where only special or consequential, but not general damages can
possibly exist, the effect of its omission simply would be that the
amount of such damage must specifically be proved. The court could
have additionally reasoned not only that Representative Patman, the
Act's co-sponsor, considered the deletion to have been the result of
legislative bargaining61 but also that the deletion was made in the
belief that the courts would not need the authorization of a general
damage provision to reach the same result.62 A contrary argument
is that the deletion can be attributed to the belief that damages would
be found in accordance with the then existing law." If the distinction
between illegal overcharges and illegal discounts was to prevail, perhaps
this argument would be formidable. However, if the reasoning that
they perform the same disservice to the non-favored competitor by
diminishing profits with which to compete is sound, the distinction
was not intended to be recognized; the ease of recovery of Sherman
Act overcharges can then be associated with suits based upon Robinson-
Patman Act discriminations. The then existing law64 would facilitate
the recovery of damages in an amount equal to the amount of the
discrimination. As the Arden court appropriately determined, any
suggestion that the law existing at the time of the passage of the
Robinson-Patman Act was the same as that of the rate cases (where
damages from discriminations had to be proven) rather than that of the
antitrust overcharge cases is misguided.6
The general damage problem was next considered in the Second
Circuit by Judge Learned Hand in Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp.,66 a case in which a manufacturer had supplied
demonstrators to competitors of the plaintiff, but not to the plaintiff.
Under the rationale of Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass, the
amount of damages awarded should have been equal to the amount
of the discrimination, here the salary of the demonstrator which was
not supplied to the plaintiff. However, the Sun court, speaking through
Judge Hand, chose not to follow the Eighth Circuit and instead
required the plaintiff to prove actual loss of business, the salary of
the demonstrator providing the limit of recovery. The court dismissed
the Supreme Court's statement in Bruce's Juices on Robinson-Patman
Act damages as being mere dictum and "neither discussed the issue[of damages] at any length, nor supported [its] belief with authority."'
61. W. PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 325 (1938).
62. Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private
Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH. L. REv. 363, 407 (1956) [hereinafter referred to as Clark].
63. H. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
64. Clark, supra note 62, at 404.
65. See note 55 supra.
66. 178 F2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
67. State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 202 F. Supp. 768, 776(N.D. Ill. 1961).
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After Sun, the Second and Eighth Circuits' positions formed the
two sides of the damage issue. As the Supreme Court in the original
Bruce's Juices decision had only dealt with American Can's claim
for breach of contract and not with the merits of Bruce's Juices' claim
that American Can had violated the Robinson-Patman Act, Bruce's
Juices brought a suit against American Can based upon these violations.
In 1951 the Fifth Circuit had Bruce's Juices on appeal. Damages were
measured according to the dictum of the Supreme Court in the original
Bruce's Juices case,"8 thus following the lead of the Eighth Circuit
in Arden.
In the same year the Eighth Circuit again considered the treble
damage question in the controversial American Can Co. v. Russellville
Canning Co.69 It has been concluded by several writers that the Eighth
Circuit's opinion in Russellville represented an abandonment of the
court's earlier opinion in Arden. This conclusion is erroneous; since
the Russellville court in effect determined that there had been no
actionable discrimination, the question of what must be proved in
order to establish the amount of damages was, therefore, never
reached. The plaintiff in Russellville sought to recover for injury
alleged to have resulted from American Can's freight equalization
practice with respect to canners located in the Ozark section of
Arkansas. American Can charged freight to canners in that section
as if the cans had been shipped from Fort Smith, a local community.
In fact, the cans came directly from Illinois and Indiana. Unfortunately
for the plaintiff, the practice favored his local competitors to a greater
extent than it did the plaintiff because the plaintiff had to pay freight
as measured from Fort Smith to Russellville, while local competitors,
located in Fort Smith itself, paid no freight at all and thus were left
in a better competitive position. The plaintiff argued that defendant
should have equalized freight from St. Louis - the point designated
for equalization in their contract for the sale of cans." If this had
been done, the plaintiff would have paid nearly two and one-half times
as much for freight but would have been left on a parity with its
competitors in the Fort Smith area.
68. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949),
aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), opinion modified, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951), dis-
cussed at notes 12 and 14 supra. See Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private
Parties: Analysis of Development in Treble Damage Suits, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1023
n.88 (1952) (the Bruce's Juices court followed, on relitigation, the dicta in the
Supreme Court case). See also Note, Antitrust - Robinson-Patman Act - Private
Litigants Need Not Show Consequential Damages in Order to Recover Treble
Damages for Price Discrimination Violations, 23 VAND. L. Rzv. 400, 403 n.30 (1970).
Although there had been a district court decision, Alexander v. Texas Co..
165 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1958), which required proof that business was actually
lost, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit indicated, in a subsequent decision
discussing competitive injury, that an award of damages would be sustained even in
the absence of proof of actual loss of business thereby following the dictum of the
Supreme Court in Bruce's Juices. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674
(5th Cir. 1965).
69. 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951).
70. Alternatively, the plaintiff could have argued for an award of the freight
costs from the points of manufacture, Indiana or Illinois, since equalizing freight
at these locations would have placed all of the local competitors on a parity. Id. at 44.
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The court denied relief on the ground that, regardless of whether
the other elements of a cause of action were present, the plaintiff had
not proved either that it actually had suffered a business loss or the
specific amount of that loss. But far from rejecting its reasoning in
Arden, the Russellville court specifically acknowledged the validity
of the Arden rule that "ordinarily, where a seller is guilty of unlawful
discrimination in prices between customers, the amount of the price
difference is the measure of damages .... ,,7' The court, however,
went on to say that "we think that this is not so here."7'  The court
reasoned that, if St. Louis had been the equalization point, it would
have enhanced the plaintiff's potential to compete locally but "would
unquestionably have impaired its ability to compete with its other
named competitors not located in the Ozark region. ' 73  The court
concluded that "[w]hat the plaintiff really complains of is not that
it was damaged by such freight equalization, but that it was not
benefited by it to the same extent as some of its local competitors. '74
Thus the court determined that measuring the damages by the amount
of the discrimination would not, under the circumstances, even reason-
ably reflect the plaintiff's actual injury because it would account only
for its injury in the immediate market but not for the benefit which
it derived from the violation in its competition outside the immediate
market.
The Russellville court also discussed the applicability of the general
damage rule to one other issue. American Can had built a plant so
close to the Morgan Packing Company's plant in Austin, Indiana, that
"a system of conveyors or runways connected [the Morgan plant]
with the production lines of the factory, ' 7' and through the use of
this system Morgan received its cans at reduced rates, referred to as
"runway allowances." The plaintiff asserted that this was a discrim-
inatory pricing practice and claimed the amount of the allowance
as damages. The court refused to consider the applicability of the
general damage approach, saying:
The plaintiff's contention that it was adversely affected by
the runway allowance made to Morgan is based upon the theory
that Morgan's products, while not the same as the plaintiff's,
competed for the "housewives' dollar," and that, if Morgan's
71. Id. at 55. The court also cited favorably the Bruce's Juices passage dis-
cussed earlier.
72. Id. The court apparently believed that the fact situation confronting it was
one of those "extraordinary circumstances" which the Court in Bruce's Juices re-
ferred to.
73. Id.
74. Id. The plaintiff alleged that it was in competition with two local canners
and that it was these competitors who received the advantage of the Fort Smith
freight equalization. But the court noted that the plaintiff had also alleged itself
to be in competition with four non-local canners and that with respect to these com-petitors the Fort Smith equalization favored the plaintiff; the court was impressed
by the fact that, if St. Louis had been the equalization point, the plaintiff would have
been placed on a parity not only with its local competitors but also with the non-local competitors, with plaintiff paying nearly two and one-half times more freight
charges. Id. at 44, 52-53; Comment, 61 YALE L.J. at 1024 n.90.
75. 191 F.2d at 50.
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canned goods were a better buy than the plaintiff's canned spinach
or canned green beans, the housewife would pass by the plaintiff's
product and buy the Morgan product. There is no evidence in
the record that any of the canned goods marketed by Morgan
during the period in suit were sold at prices which had the effect
of diverting housewives from the canned spinach and canned
green beans of the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff sustained any
actual damage from the granting of the runway allowance. "The
only proper proof of damages is the loss to the plaintiff's busi-
ness, . . ." Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corporation . . .7
Since the approach which allows the assumptions that injury to com-
petition and injury to the plaintiff in the amount of the discrimination
occur when there has been a competitive discrimination may, of course,
only be used where there is a showing both that the buyers were in
competition and that the defendant has discriminated against the
plaintiff, the Russellville court's refusal to make any of these assump-
tions appears to follow logically from a determination that Russellville
and Morgan were not, in fact, in competition with each other. Morgan
"was a competitor of the plaintiff only in the sense that both packed
and sold canned vegetables."77  The court did not hold that the
amount of the discrimination would not normally be a proper measure
of damages had the other elements of a cause of action been present.
However, the court seemed willing to allow the plaintiff to reapproach
the competition question through the back door, by proving the actual
amount of its injury which resulted from American Can's granting
of a runway allowance to Morgan. The unstated premise of this
approach appears to be that, if actual injury is shown by the plaintiff,
the buyers must have been in competition. If this approach were cor-
rect, then the plaintiff would indeed have to prove the actual amount
of his injury in order to utilize the approach. Obviously this premise
is incorrect since the court already found that Russellville and Morgan
were not in competition. But as illogical as this reasoning is, it can
only be assumed that it was, in fact, the attitude adopted by the court;
no other explanation can reveal how the court could quote Sun to
the effect that "[t]he only proper proof of damages is the loss to the
plaintiff's business" after having firmly stated earlier in its opinion
that, ordinarily, "the amount of the price difference is the measure
of damages .... ,78
Contrary to one writer's opinion,79 it is generally accepted80 that
the Russellville court's approach to the general damage question can-
76. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 50.
78. See note 73 supra.
79. Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir. 1957).
80. Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1250 n.1 (9th Cir. 1969) ; State
Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 202 F. Supp. 768, 776 (N.D. Ill.
1961) ; Becker-Lehmann, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 202 F. Supp. 514, 517
(E.D. Mo. 1959) (arguing that Russellville is not inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's dictum in Bruce's Juices, but instead involved "extraordinary circumstances");
Comment, 61 YALE L.J. at 1024 n.90.
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not be taken to overrule its decision in Arden since the court was
faced in Russellville with what Bruce's Juices referred to as "extra-
ordinary circumstances," where the setting of freight equalization
procedures concerned matters beyond the scope of general damages
and where the granting of runway allowances to Morgan did not even
support a prima facie case."' Even Judge Johnsen's dissent in Russell-
ville agreed with the majority's approach but would have gone further
so as to allow recovery for the discriminatory freight equalization since
the plaintiff had a higher out-of-pocket cost than its immediate com-
petitors notwithstanding the benefit derived by the plaintiff over the
more remote competitors. 2
The measure of damage question was not again before the Second
Circuit until 1957 in Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co.8 There
Judge Hand, writing for the majority, discussed more succinctly the
measure of damages which he had advocated in Sun: "The [plaintiff's]
gross loss was the profit on any sales that it would have made to the
nine [favored] competitors' customers whom it could and would, have
retained, had it been able to buy from the defendant at the same price
as the competitors. From this must, however, be deducted what added
profit it may have got by being free to charge what it chose ... .
Judge Hand's opinion was based on his previous decision in Sun
"that the discrimination was not a proper measure of the loss." '8 5 As
was the case in Sun, one obstacle to his reasoning was the conflicting
language in Bruce's Juices,"8 which he disposed of by again arguing
that the Supreme Court really did not have before it the question of
the measure of damages when it made the statement and that, in any
event, the actual damages in that case might well have been equal
to the amount of the price discrimination if the discrimination had not
been passed on to Bruce's Juices' customers.8 " Some writers believe
Judge Hand to have been retreating from Sun by his recognition that
whether the added cost was passed on is an issue which is relevant in
determining what the measure of damages would be; in Sun his
position appears to have been that actual damages must be proved
in any case.8 8 Finally, Judge Hand reinforced his opinion by con-
cluding that "the Eighth Circuit appears to have overruled its earlier
view [the Arden rule] in a second majority decision, American Can
Co. v. Russellville Canning Co.""9 Since, as discussed earlier, the
81. Under this factual setting it is apparent why the Supreme Court in Hanover
cited Russellville, as well as the relitigated Bruce's Juices, discussed at notes 12
and 14 supra, as support for the proposition that "where no differential can be proved
between the price unlawfully charged and some price that the seller was required bylaw to charge, establishing damages might require a showing of loss of profits to
the buyer." Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
82. American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 62-63 (1951).
83. 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
84. Id. at 458.
85. Id. at 459.
86. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
87. Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir. 1957).
88. See text accompanying note 96 infra.
89. Id. at 459 (citations omitted); Becker-Lehmann, Inc. v. Firestone Tire &Rubber Co., 202 F. Supp. 514, 517 (E.D. Mo. 1959) (asserting that Russellville does
not overrule Arden).
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Russellville court did not overrule Arden, this conclusion is erroneous.Whether judge Hand is legally correct in his requirement that theproof of damages be more extensive than a mere showing of a meas-
urable discrimination is the issue central to this entire discussion;but right or wrong, it has to be conceded that, if his reasoning is toprevail, it certainly will create a hardship for those non-favored com-petitors who do not have at their disposal the funds required to gatherthe evidence necessary to favorably answer any of the myriad ques-
tions that a court requiring his type of proof of damages might ask."0What chance would an individual filling station operator have against
a major oil company if put to the burden of making such extensive
proof ?9
With both sides of the damage issue then adequately represented,the Seventh Circuit court in State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co.9 2 was able to give skillful deference to existingtheories in expressing the status of the law in that circuit."3 Thedefendant, a supplier of products to A&P, paid for advertising of the
supplier's products in Woman's Day, a magazine owned by a sub-
sidiary of A&P. Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act was vio-lated when payments were not made available on proportionately equalterms to all other customers of the supplier who were also competing
with A&P. In awarding damages the court held:
90. For example, the court properly might ask who his competitors are; what ishis market area; what are his and his competitors market shares; what effect on hisloss of business did the discrimination have; would he have lost the business anyway;
was the loss in profits passed on; or was loss due to seasonal adjustments, faulty
management or superior management techniques of competitors.
91. See American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,377 U.S. 954 (1964) (taking the position that the plaintiff must prove injury),discussed in Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 1960). TheAmerican Oil decision should be confined to the fact situation of that case in light ofthe Seventh Circuit's decisions in National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517(7th Cir. 1968) and State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 202 F.Supp. 768, 776 (N.D. Ill. 1961), in which the Seventh Circuit did not followEnterprise and Sun. See also Dantzler v. Dictograph Prod., Inc., 309 F.2d 326, 330(4th Cir. 1962) (citing Enterprise and Sun); Freedman v. Philadelphia TerminalsAuction Co., 301 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1962) (which allowed use of the passing-ondefense, a decision which now must be reconsidered in light of Hanover's attitudetoward this defense) ; Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497, 499 (6th Cir.1961) (although Kidd could be interpreted as authority for requiring proof of dam-ages, it only involved a jury instruction that "damages must be determined withreasonable certainty") ; Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp.345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (decided in the Second Circuit and, therefore, following Enter-prise) ; Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 149 (D. Ore. 1958) (also follow-ing Enterprise - this decision has been overruled by Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick,415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969) which allowed the granting of general damages);Alexander v. Texas Co., 165 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1958) (although the plaintiffin Alexander was required to prove damages, Bruce's Juices and Foremost Dairies,Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 959 (1965), do not sustain
this approach).
92. 202 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
93. State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 202 F. Supp. 768,777 (N.D. Ill. 1961). See National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517 (7thCir. 1968). But cf. American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964), where no competitive injury was found to have resultedfrom a short-term discrimination. Today American Oil might be decided differentlyin light of National, which held that competitive injury and, inferentially, generaldamages could be assumed from the fact of discrimination.
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: * .a non-favored customer incurring expenses or costs which
it would not have sustained if its supplier had complied with the
provisions of Section 2(d) and had reimbursed it for these ex-
penses . . .has in fact been damaged, in the absence of proof
of other damages, to the extent of the payments it ought to have,
but did not, receive from its supplier. As a result of the violation,
the non-favored customer is left with less in its treasury - less
in profits, less to carry on its business, or less to keep in reserve.
The non-favored customer has less money than he would other-
wise have, and therefore, has been damaged.94
The court, in selecting the Arden general damage approach, dealt
with the assertion that the Eighth Circuit had reversed itself in
Russellville by recognizing that Russellville is not inconsistent with
Arden but rather "merely carved out an exception to the [Arden rule]
which is not applicable to the instant case."95 The last obstacles in
the way to the court's full acceptance of a general damages approach,
the Sun and Enterprise opinions of Judge Hand, were aptly handled
by the court when it stated:
Judge Learned Hand, who wrote the [Sun and Enterprise]
opinion[s], concluded, summarily, that the "only proper proof
of damage is the loss to the plaintiff's business, and the salary of
a 'demonstrator' is not such a loss." The court, in that case,
equated business loss to the amount of business diverted, as a
result of the discrimination, from the non-favored customer to
the favored customer. In reaching these conclusions, Judge Hand
neither discussed the issue at any length, nor supported his belief
with authority. Opposed to this ruling are the many well-con-
sidered authorities herein cited and others, which hold that an
out-of-pocket expense or increased cost of business is a proper
element of damage under Section 4 of the Clayton Act ... "
The latest decision97 to discuss the damage question is Fowler Manu-facturing Co. v. Gorlick,9" a Ninth Circuit opinion by Judge John-
94. 202 F. Supp. at 774.
95. Id. at 776.
96. Id. at 776-77 (citations omitted). The court's rationale eliminates the dis-
tinction between treatment of price increases and discounts by equating Sherman Act
and Robinson-Patman Act damage theories. See Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), on remand, 223 F. Supp. 712, aff'd, 346
F.2d 661, 666 (6th Cir. 1965); Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp.,
307 F.2d 916, 921-22 (5th Cir. 1962); Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block &
Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1959)
American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1951).
97. There were three cases decided after State Wholesale Grocers and before
Fowler that awarded damages, but no significant discussion of the measure of dan-
ages accompanied the decisions. Dantzler v. Dictograph Prod., Inc., 309 F.2d 326(4th Cir. 1962), held that the plaintiff must prove damages; Freedman v. Philadelphia
Terminal Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1962), held that a general damage
recovery was permissible if the extra cost had not been passed on; Ben B. Swartz
& Sons, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Mich. 1962), also
accepted a general damages approach.
98. 415 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1969). The court acknowledged that an opinion
of one district court in the Ninth Circuit did not recognize a general damages approach
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sen,9 9 who also wrote the opinion in Arden and who partially dis-
sented in Russellville. In Fowler the plaintiff operated wholesale
plumbing supply houses. The defendant supplied the plaintiff and his
three principal competitors with water heaters whose similarity of de-
sign caused retail pricing of them to be highly competitive. The
plaintiff determined that the defendant had discriminated between
the plaintiff and the three competitors in setting prices and in giving
allowances, and in an action brought under the Robinson-Patman
Act sought to recover at least the amount of the discrimination as
damages. The district court accepted this as the measure of the plain-
tiff's damages and awarded judgment against the defendant for treble
damages.
In answer to the defendant's challenge, for lack of probative basis,
of the district court's assumption that competitive injury necessarily
results from discrimination in highly competitive situations, the Ninth
Circuit decided that the validity of this "assumption" was immaterial
since:
... the right of a court to grant a general damage award under
the Robinson-Patman Act for the amount of an illegal difference
in prices and allowances does not depend upon its having been
evidentially established, and the court's being able to find on the
basis thereof, that a lessening of competition has in fact occurred,
and that the extent of the injury occasioned thereby in the par-
ticular situation corresponds to the amount of the discrimination.
The Act permits recovery of the amount of a discrimination in
prices and allowances without the necessity of any such specific
proof or finding as a basis therefor.' °
Exactly what the court meant as to the question of the validity
of the assumption being "immaterial" is not clear; the difference be-
tween the assumption, the need for which the court disclaimed, that
injury to competition necessarily results from discrimination in a
highly competitive situation, and the court's approach of finding a
competitive injury without "its having been evidentially established,"
is difficult to discover. At the most, this analysis would seem to adopt
a "per se" approach'' to competitive injury and may be more extreme
than even the "assumption" decisions. (Quaere: Would the Fowler
court allow the defendant to rebut this finding of competitive in-
jury?) In any case, the competitive injury requirement is at least
consistent with the conclusion of the earlier discussion on the assump-
tion of injury to competition at the buyer level.
The holding is clear that the damages can be measured by the
amount of the discrimination since, as the court stated, the "direct-
[Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146 (D. Ore. 1958)], an attitude which
is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fowler.
99. Judge Johnsen, Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit, sat by designation in this
Ninth Circuit case.
100. Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1969).
101. For a discussion of this per se approach, see Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC,
348 F.2d 674, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959.
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damage right would more effectively serve to curb the discriminations
which Congress viewed as being most often exercised against smaller
competitors . . . than the more difficult consequential-damage rule of
the Enterprise case."' 2  For further support, the court quoted the
Bruce's Juices dictum to the effect that the Supreme Court's reason
for use of the general damage approach was premised on the theory
that "[i]t is clear Congress intended to use private self-interest as
a means of enforcement."' ' 3
For some reason, the Fowler court attempted to support its
holding by the statement that "we are unable to see any reason for
legalistically equating or construing the Robinson-Patman Act upon
identical lines with the Sherman Act as to the form of its remedial
damage rights."'0 4 This apparently self-defeating statement was in-
cluded in deference to a similar passage in Bruce's Juices to the same
effect.'0 5 But the Supreme Court had been responding to the de-
fendant's attempt to assert a Robinson-Patman Act violation as a
defense to non-payment of a contract in Bruce's Juices; the Supreme
Court had held that, although in some cases violation of the Sherman
Act can be asserted as a defense to a suit for non-payment of an
amount due upon a contract, such an assertion cannot be made under
the Robinson-Patman Act because "the entire basis for judging under
the two Acts is different and ... the case law as to the Sherman Act
does not fit the Robinson-Patman Act.' 01 6 No reference was made
by the Supreme Court to the consistency or inconsistency of dam-
age remedies under the two acts. And in spite of its own dictum
suggesting different measures of damages under the two acts, the
Fowler court pointed out that, even under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, "[e]vidence that a merchant has been required to pay
more for goods which he resells is sufficient to establish, prima facie,
that he has been damaged... [and] that profits on resale were less,"'07
which suggests that the Fowler court recognized the close relationship
between the amount of the discrimination and the amount of damages
under either act.
What the Fowler court intended to accomplish by its distinction
between the damage remedies provided by the two acts is not apparent.
It seems clear that it was not necessary to make such a statement in
order to award general damages under section 4 in light of the Bruce's
Juices dictum that in Robinson-Patman Act cases the damages can
be equal to the illegal difference in price.108  One explanation for
Fowler's concern might be that the court was aware of the require-
102. 415 F.2d at 1251.
103. Id. at 1251-52.
104. Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1252 (1969).
105. The Fowler court quoted Mr. Justice Jackson's remark in the majority
opinion in Bruce's Juices that "these characteristics show that the entire basis forjudging under the two Acts is different and that the case law as to the Sherman Actdoes not fit the Robinson-Patman Act." Id. at 1251, citing Bruce's Juices, Inc. V.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 756 (1947).
106. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 756 (1947).
107. Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1252 n.2 (9th Cir. 1969).
108. Id.
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ment in Sherman Act cases of proof of loss of profits or business
where no overcharge is alleged.1"9 But if this were the basis for the
court's statement, it fails to distinguish between Sherman Act cases
involving allegations of overcharges and those that do not; the former,
where general damages are awarded,"0 analogizes with discrimination
cases, whereas the latter, where proof of loss of profits is required,
does not."' Perhaps the Fowler court was hesitant to utilize this
distinction for fear of complicating their opinion with other theories
and found it easier, by invoking a less precise distinction, to deny
any thought of associating any Sherman Act requirement of proof of
loss with recovery under the Robinson-Patman Act.
Neither Fowler nor its predecessors would require general dam-
age awards in all illegal price discrimination cases. The Fowler
holding is expressly limited to highly competitive situations. Where
it is apparent from the nature of a particular business or market that
passing on would, of necessity, have to have taken place (as, for ex-
ample, in the situation where the plaintiff's profits were earned under
a "cost plus" contract), passing-on may still prevent recovery even
under the Sherman Act. As the Hanover decision to refuse to accept
passing-on as a defense was based in part on the difficulty, which a
plaintiff faced with that defense would encounter, of proving loss of
profits as consequential damages, its holding may not reach the situa-
tion where no such difficulty is present." 2  Furthermore, the rule
allowing general damages in the amount of the discrimination does
not prevent the use of defenses such as justifications based upon changes
in the defendant's costs or in his competitor's pricing, or claims that
like goods were available to the plaintiff at the lower price from
another source.
When consideration is given to various cases that have deliberated
the general damage issue, it becomes apparent that the only judicial
expressions which are adverse to setting damages at a figure equal
to the amount of the discrimination are Judge Hand's unsupported
assertions in Sun and Enterprise in the Second Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit's cryptic statement in Dantzler v. Dictograph Products, Inc."'
that "[t] he need for one who claims damages . . . to show the causal
connection between the losses he suffers and the illegal acts of the
defendant is clearly shown," a statement which, without comment,
relied upon Enterprise."4 Contrary to those are the opinions of the
Fifth," 5 Sixth,"' Seventh," 7 Eighth" 8 and Ninth..9 Circuits, which
109. Comment, 60 Mica. L. REV. at 367, 404.
110. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
111. Comment, 60 MicH. L. REv. at 367, 404.
112. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 2589 (2d Cir., Mar.
29, 1971).
113. 309 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1962). There is also the ambiguous Kidd v. EssoStandard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1961), discussed at notes 51 and 91 supra.
114. 309 F.2d at 330.
115. Cases cited at note 68 supra.
116. Cases cited at note 51 supra.
117. Cases cited at notes 92 and 93 supra.
118. Cases cited at notes 53 and 69 supra.
119. Cases cited at note 98 supra.
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are favorable to general damage awards; the First, Third, 2 ' and Tenth
Circuits have not considered the issue. Since Judge Hand apparently
recognized in Enterprise the validity of general damage awards if there
has been no passing on of the increased cost, the position on the issue
of even the Enterprise court is shrouded with doubt in light of
Hanover's recent negation of the passing-on defense. Moreover, the
weakness of the requirement of proof of consequential damages is re-
vealed by those courts that have adopted it; all of the courts requiring
such proof utilized as authority for their decision either the unsup-
ported conclusion of Judge Hand in Enterprise or their own uncorrobo-
rated assertions.' 2' Since, as will be seen, the policy behind the statute
is, in fact, contrary to such a strict interpretation of damage remedies,
policy arguments were not available for support.
This all leads to the conclusion that, although the courts have
not literally equated remedies under the Sherman Act for illegal over-
charges with Robinson-Patman Act remedies for price discounts, in
effect they have done so by allowing the difference between the legal
and illegal prices to constitute the measure of damages, on the theory
that discount discrimination causes an increased cost of operation.
When Hanover's22 language on the difficulty of determining pricing
policies and its reference to the amount of the overcharge as the
measure of damages are compared with the Bruce's Juices dictum 2
to the same effect and with the reasoning of Morton Salt'24 which
equates a discrimination in favor of one buyer with the charging of
an illegally high price to his competitor, it appears that the Supreme
Court has reached the same conclusion. By this analysis, section 4
becomes a unified cohesive instrument for damage recovery for either
a Sherman Act price increase or a Robinson-Patman Act price dis-
crimination. Accordingly, the respective case law principles pertaining
to these damage remedies would be virtually interchangeable; as sug-
gested earlier, a literal reading of section 4 does not suggest a con-
trary result. Hanover's language then "fits" price discrimination
cases, "passing-on" is no longer a defense, and the amount of the dis-
crimination becomes the measure by which damages are determined.
Indications of the appropriateness of this method of recovery
under the Robinson-Patman Act are additionally found in an ex-
amination of the policy behind the statute. One view is that, since
Congress intended to use private self-interest as a means of maintain-
ing equal treatment in the market place, 125 this can only be facilitated
120. Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.
1962) (although the opinion contains no discussion of the validity of a general dam-
age approach, the court did allow the use of a passing-on defense).
121. See cases cited at note 91 supra.
122. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
123. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
125. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947) ; Barber,
Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Law: The Robinson-Patman Experience, 30GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181, 183, 221 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Barber] ; Note, TheDefense of "Passing On" in Treble Damage Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70
YALE L.J. 469, 473 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note, 70 YALE L.J.].
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by allowing easier methods of recovery. Additionally, from the stand-
point of providing intensive surveillance of those firms which have
the power and propensity to discriminate, this technique is a valuable
one.'26 Considering that violations of some sections of the Robinson-
Patman Act are not crimes, those sections are not criminally enforce-
able and, therefore, private actions become of correspondingly greater
significance. 27 Moreover, if the deterrent effect of the treble damage
statute is to be fully realized, 12 it may be improvident to depend upon
accurate compensation of the ultimate consumer (to whom the dis-
crimination may have been "passed on") since they will be unlikely
to sue. 129 Accordingly, the first purchaser must be allowed to recover
what may amount to a windfall, or the violator will escape liability
altogether.' Of course, under the Hanover rationale it is doubtful
that the recovery of the amount of any discrimination could ever
amount to a windfall since in reality there is always a loss of profits.'
Since the Act's principal objectives - small business protection and
compensation - were intended to be obtained through private enforce-
ment of the Act, and since these goals have not been attained to any
meaningful extent,3 2 there is a real need for the easier method of re-
covery in accord with that of the Utah Pie and Morton Salt cases (with
respect to proof of competitive injury) and with that of the Hanover
and Bruce's Juices cases (with respect to recovery of damages)."'
126. See Flintkote v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 835 (1957) ; Barber, supra note 125, at 183, 221.
127. See Atlas Building Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950,
954 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 843 (1960); ROWE, supra note 24, at
459-61; Barber, supra note 125, at 184 n.11.
128. See Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969); National
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 1968); PATMAN, COMPLETE
GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 923 (1938), referred to in Bruce's Juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 988 (1949). The purpose of the Act is
to insure equality of treatment and opportunity to small businessmen. Id. at 991-92.
See also Barber, supra note 125, at 216; Comment, 60 MicH. L. REv. at 1113.
129. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mf . Co., 335 F.2d 203, 208
(7th Cir. 1964) ; Note, 70 YALE L.J., supra note 125, at 477. See Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264, 265 (1946); Barber, supra note 125, at
220-21. It is certainly logical not to wait for the ultimate consumer to sue for
recovery of the illegal difference in price since his cost increase may be measured only
in pennies; when this is the case, his motivation to bring suit will be at a minimum.
130. Id. See Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 564
(1931).
131. A buyer who resells either under a cost-plus contract or in an inelastic
market would receive a windfall if he were awarded the amount of the illegal dis-
crimination as damages. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 522
(7th Cir. 1968).
132. See Barber, supra note 125, at 197, 215-16.
133. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-47 n.13 (1948). See also
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1945), holding that a
jury may make a reasonable estimate of damages based upon its consideration of
relevant data; the wrongdoer bears the risk of uncertainty. The court indicated its
willingness to lessen plaintiff's burden of proof.
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